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Abstract 
The prevention of sports accidents must rely on a detailed knowledge of 
accident circumstances and risk factors. Today, very few studies have 
investigated in depth non-fatal drowning incidents that have occurred in 
public swimming pools (PSP). Learning from incidents seems likely to advance 
the knowledge of accident scenarios. This research study aimed to capture 
minor incidents that might identify safety lessons and preventive measures. 
Incidents of minor and major aquatic events were collected from four PSPs that 
had hosted 700,000 bathers per year. About 800 incidents and 300 aquatic 
rescues performed by lifeguards were recorded within a time frame of two and 
one-half years. The analysis of results offered insights both in terms of 
managing risk and preventing drownings. Drowning risk management could 
directly benefit from the results of this study. Methodological recommendations 
also provided suggestions to ensure the proper collection of non-fatal drowning 
incidents in PSPs. 
Keywords: public swimming pools, incidents, non-fatal drownings, aquatic 
rescues, injury prevention, risk analysis 
Introduction 
The effectiveness of the prevention of sports accidents1 is usually addressed 
through informational issues related to clear statements and the adequate 
understanding of preventive messages. Historically, in-depth knowledge of the 
frequency of accidents, identification of risk factors, formulation of victim 
profiles, and accident scenarios were expected measures2 (Bahr & Krosshaug, 
2005, Rasmussen & Svedung, 2000). 
Recent research on recreational sports practiced in hazardous 
environments such as mountainous areas (Vanpoulle, Vignac & Soulé, 2017) or 
aquatic settings (Vignac, Lebihain & Soulé, 2015) have highlighted that the 
factual knowledge of accidents has not been perfected. These findings raise an 
important issue regarding the possibility of building prevention campaigns on 
concrete elements about accident circumstances and scenarios (Bierens & 
Scapigliati, 2014; Idris, Berg, Bierens, Bossaert, Branche, Gabrielli, Graves, 
Handley, Hoelle, & Morley, 2003). Thus, the accidentology (i.e., scientific 
study of accidents, their causes and consequences) of sports practiced in risky 
environments could be improved in France. 
We propose in this article an alternative means of advancing the 
knowledge of drowning sequences in public swimming pools (PSP): examining 
and learning from non-fatal drowning incidents3 instead of merely relying on 
actual fatal drowning accidents. Closely examining feedback of problematic 
situations in terms of safety such as particular conditions which could have 
turned into an accident could be used to draw preventive lessons.4 Incidentology 
has the advantage of skirting some persistent barriers to accessing accurate 
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accident data. First, stakeholders don’t have to face the same emotional, moral, 
and legal issues as in the case of a fatal drowning accident. Moreover, based on 
many situations,5  the study of non-fatal drowning incidents shows promise 
thanks to the larger number of cases to be analyzed.  After having detailed the 
conceptual and methodological frameworks of this approach, we have reported 
on a 32 month-long initiative concerning the risk of drowning in a convenience 
sample of French public swimming pools (PSP).  
Background Theory 
Accident causation is classically described as a complex process involving not 
only entire socio-technical systems (Rasmussen, 1997) but also 
interdependencies within systems of systems (Harvey & Stanton, 2014). It is 
consequently inappropriate to attribute a whole accident to a single error in 
decision-making, without considering all of the influences, mechanisms, and 
constraints that shaped that decision, and, more broadly speaking, human 
behaviour (Perrow, 2004; Leveson, 2004). Accidents usually proceed as the 
result of the interaction of various, sometimes scattered, causes or contributory 
factors (Lundberg, Rollenhagen, & Hollnagel, 2009) rooted in different time 
scales. 
In Leveson’s System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
(STAMP), systems are interrelated components kept in a state of dynamic 
equilibrium by feedback loops of information and control. According to 
Leveson’s model, a system is a dynamic process that is continually adapting to 
achieve its ends and to react to changes in itself and its environment. This model 
can easily be transferred to aquatic environments such as PSP: to be kept in 
balance, the system constantly is adapted through safety control loops (e.g., 
supervision by lifeguards, swimming skill levels, specific attention of 
supervising staff to vulnerable users, contingent detection of a person in distress 
by a bather, computerized video system for drowning detection) (Rasmussen & 
Svedung, 2000; Vignac, Lebihain, & Soulé, 2016; 2018). If one (or more) of 
these control loops fails, or if the system’s equilibrium is offset by the 
interaction of its components, the probability of the emergence of an accident 
scenario increases (whether the actual outcome is an accident or merely a close 
call). 
When the weak hazard signals that incubate in a system (Turner & 
Pidgeon, 1978) are taken into account, it is more likely that they will not escalate 
into an actual accident sequence (Leveson, 2004). Weill-Fassina & Pastré 
(2004) stated that this way of thinking focuses on serious accidents as well as 
on less serious incidents and thus should serve as forerunner signals of hazards 
that must not be overlooked (Vaughan, 1996). Less serious incidents and near-
misses actually result from mechanisms and underlying factors similar to those 
causing accidents (Harrald, Spahn, Van Dorp, Merrick, Shresta, & Grabowski, 
1998). More and more frequently, feedback methods resulting from experience 
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are applied to close calls, defined as “any situation in which a sequence of 
events was interrupted, preventing the occurrence of potentially serious 
consequences” (Van der Schaaf, 1991). When an incident occurs, one must keep 
in mind that slight circumstantial changes could have led to much more serious 
consequences (Gambino & Mallon, 1991). In fact, some accidents result from 
failures to learn from previous incidents (Hopkins, 2008); not learning from 
incidents is subsequently an incident to study in itself (Drupsteen & Hasle, 
2014). 
According to Mazaheri, Montewka, Nisula, and Kujala (2015), “both 
positive and negative experiences can be tracked” (p. 206). These include safety 
factors6 that failed, but also decisions and actions that prevented the escalation 
to an accident. Instead of regarding spectacular or dramatic events occurring in 
extreme conditions, learning from minor incidents and weak signals (as defined 
by Drupsteen & Wybo, 2015) can help to grasp characteristics of ordinary 
accident sequences as they unfold in normal conditions (Plant & Stanton, 2012). 
The sharing of incident accounts is based on the principle that it is 
everyone’s responsibility to consult and eventually apply such “lessons” (Lukic, 
Margaryan, & Littlejohn, 2010). In this paper, we aimed to analyze a sample of 
the data gathered this way in order to make sense of this information and to 
enhance the knowledge and prevention of accident sequences (Lukic, 
Littlejohn, & Margaryan, 2012). Our intent was to emphasize the preventive 
value of near-miss sequences in PSP. 
Method 
The data collection was undertaken as part of a larger research project dealing 
with the prevention of drowning risk in four PSPs within an urban 
agglomeration of western France. These four PSPs had been built between 1966 
and 1976, and their cumulative annual attendance was close to 700,000 visitors 
during the study period. The incident collection tool aimed to record all 
assistance and relief operations that occurred during the supervision of the pools 
by lifeguards, including those without medical consequences. It was designed 
to be participatory, and at the end of a short test period, the lifeguards were 
invited to make comments in order to improve and simplify the collection tool. 
Lifeguards working in the four PSPs were invited to contribute, both 
through their supervisory hierarchy (i.e., management memo presenting the 
tool, the collection method, and its interest) and during an oral presentation by 
the researcher. During this presentation, the importance of systematically 
reporting interventions carried out during supervision was emphasized along 
with the preventive usefulness of comprehensive data gathering. Although the 
focus was on accident sequences that could lead to accidents or drownings, we 
also encouraged lifeguards to report mundane, apparently-innocuous events 
such as the treatment of minor injuries such as cuts and bruises or preventive 
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advice provided to those vulnerable and at risk. In order for lifeguards to 
complete the survey without diverting them from their primary supervision 
mission, the collection tool (see Figure 1) had to be simple, quick to fill out (i.e., 
one minute at most), accessible, user-friendly, accurate, confidential, and 
perceived as useful (Sepeda, 2006; Yang & Maxwell, 2011).  
For practical reasons, a notebook was made available in each facility 
with a single page dedicated to each incident. Most of the information in the 
pre-structured form simply needed to be circled or ticked (see Figure 1 and 
Table 1). The lower part of the form included an open field to let the lifeguards 
describe the cause(s) considered to be at the origin of the incident. Since this 
narrative field was the most time-consuming to complete on the reporting form, 
it was omitted in a number of cases (n=70). 
According to Le Coze and Lim (2004), the regular collection of reported 
incidents, combined with feedback, can reinforce the staff's sense of usefulness. 
It is likely to increase its involvement in terms of data gathering. For this 
purpose, the reported incidents were collected on-site on a regular basis (each 
month), providing an additional opportunity to be supportive. This monthly 
collection has helped to counter decreases in the involvement due to 
forgetfulness or lack of time, that often happens after the novelty wears off. The 
quantitative data were then entered in an Excel matrix, then coded, and 
categorized to facilitate their analysis. 
Table 1. Categories of the incident collection tool 
Occurrence 
data 
Demographic 
data 
Context data Incident data 
Date, hour, 
day, place 
Sex, age, type of 
public, swimming 
skills 
Estimated frequency 
at the time of the 
incident, duration of 
the intervention, 
place of intervention 
Type of 
intervention, causes 
and circumstances, 
type of detection, 
type of rescue 
To understand how this initiative was perceived and to identify possible 
variations in terms of involvement, we conducted 30 semi-structured interviews 
in parallel with lifeguards engaged in the data collection. These interviews made 
it possible to identify 1) how the data collection tool was actually used  and 2) 
the nature of the data effectively gathered (e.g., comprehensiveness, detail 
level).7
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Figure 1. English version of the survey form 
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Results 
Demographic Information 
From July 2013 to January 2016 (i.e., over 32 months), 791 interventions were 
reported, including 282 (36%) aquatic rescues. An aquatic rescue was defined 
as the intervention of a lifeguard during an accident sequence. It could take 
different forms: a hand reached out, the use of a pole, or a dive into the water. 
In such cases, the absence of any lifeguard action could have led to a fatal 
drowning accident. This first result could either have been worrying (about the 
actual risk of drowning) or reassuring (in terms of supervision efficiency). The 
treatment of cuts and other minor injuries (e.g., nosebleeds, lacerations) 
accounted for the most frequent of the lifeguards’ activities during supervision 
(n = 385; 49%). Matthews, Alister, & Franklin (2008) made a similar 
observation about lifeguards’ activities. One hundred twenty-eight (128) 
interventions were initiated by cases of faintness, dispute, severe traumatic 
injury, or the delivery of preventive advice. 
In the French PSPs studied, the care for bathers who suffer minor 
injuries was an integral part of the lifeguards’ missions. This part of the job had 
not been clearly anticipated in terms of global safety management. For example, 
temporary absences of a lifeguard due to the treatment of bruises were often not 
compensated by other staff in support. As a consequence, adequate pool 
supervision was frequently impaired (Vignac, Lebihain & Soulé, 2016). It is 
important for readers to realize that the prevention of drowning cannot be 
understood in isolation from the daily operation of a PSP. For example, the RID 
factors (an acronym for failures of recognition, intrusion, and distraction) 
stressed that lifeguards who are distracted by intrusions into their supervisory 
routines were less prone to catch a person in distress (Pia, 1984). 
A substantial majority of incidents required more than 3 minutes (n = 
437 versus 307 incidents necessitating less than 3 minutes) with a proportion of 
interventions lasting more than 6 minutes (n=177). It is worth mentioning that 
on the physiopathological timeline used in anoxia and drowning, the average 
survival rate seems to drop to 25% after 3 minutes of immersion while it is still 
75% between 1- and 3-minute immersions (Mathon, Aymard, Kretyl & Levraut, 
2011). 
Aquatic Rescues and the Potentiality for Drowning Accidents.  
Males were slightly more likely to be rescued than females (n=153 versus 110) 
with no significant difference. Of course, it is important to realize that 
historically males have represented more than 75% of drowning victims across 
all ages. Harada, Goto & Nathanson (2011) and Pitt (1994) reached the same 
conclusions. Adolescents (10-19 years old according to WHO), adults and 
seniors are rarely or very rarely helped (n=37). On the other hand, as Hunsucker 
and Davidson (2011) found, the under-6-year-olds (n=112) and the 6-9-year-
olds (n = 130) required, by far, the greatest number of aquatic rescues. 
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Nevertheless, belonging to the category of "non-swimmers" constituted 
the most discriminating variable in predicting a need for a rescue (n=233 aquatic 
rescues); moreover, no "swimmer" aged 6 years or younger required aquatic 
rescues. Since no precise definition was available, we considered for this study 
that a "non-swimmer" was unable to achieve 25 meters without support and/or 
flotation device. Among "non-swimmers" older than 6 years old, the number of 
aquatic rescues was significant (n=103), but it remained slightly lower than for 
"non-swimmers" younger than 6 years (n=105). 
Aquatic rescues occurred mainly during periods of average (n = 119) 
and low (n = 115) attendance (versus 39 and 7 in periods of high and very high 
attendance, respectively). Even if off-peak periods were often described as 
lending themselves to decreased lifeguard vigilance, these results confirmed the 
importance of the co-supervision phenomenon: in periods of high attendance 
when pools were saturated with users, apparently the risk of drowning without 
being seen (especially by another bather) was reduced. According to Harrell and 
Boisvert (2003), lifeguards’ supervisory observations were stimulated during 
peak periods, mitigating the actual risk of drowning. On the other hand, Vittone 
and Pia (2006), Avramidis, Butterly, & Llewellyn (2007), and Griffiths (2002) 
explained that in most cases, drownings occurred under the eyes of users who 
didn’t realize and/or perceive what was happening, perhaps because they felt 
the risk was low. 
A proportion of aquatic rescues were reported to have occurred to "free 
bathers" (n=158). We can hypothesize that other types of aquatic activity (e.g., 
training, learning, recreating) benefitted from dedicated coaching or 
instructional activities which likely interrupted earlier accidental sequences 
(Pitt, 1994). The situation regarding schoolchildren was a peculiar one: learning 
to swim and getting familiar with the aquatic environment necessitates 
controlled and limited risk-taking for pedagogical purposes. Because flotation 
devices were contextually prohibited outside instructional settings, a number of 
rescues (n=67) occurred among this novice population. 
When all ages were combined, the majority of aquatic rescues occurred 
in shallower pool depths (n=195) versus in deeper areas of pools (n = 83) where 
the victims necessarily could not touch the bottom. Adolescents, adults, and 
seniors needed assistance in the large pools (n = 31) while rescue operations 
were launched for children (ages 9 or younger) in shallower depth pools 
(n=192). Both Wendling Vogelsong, Wuensch and Ammirati (2007) and 
Hunsucker & Davidson (2011) previously had highlighted similar results. In 
most cases, lifeguards themselves detected the drowning process that lead to 
rescues (n=174). Detections by a third party (e.g., non-lifeguard staff, viii 
teachers, animators, caregivers, or other bathers) were mentioned in only a small 
number of occasions (n = 21).  
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The majority of aquatic pool rescues in this study were extension 
rescues, that is, carried out using a pole (n=130). Direct intervention in the pool 
accounted for 67 cases, while in 46 circumstances, a third party intervened. 
Lifeguards who detected an emergency situation sometimes involved a third 
party nearby. In only 18 cases, the interventions were limited to assisting the 
victim by stretching out the hand (i.e., a “reaching” rescue). The reasons for the 
origins of each rescue were often described through a short narrative of the 
situation.  
Supervision deficiencies (resulting on the part of non-lifeguards) (n=97) 
and overestimation of swimming capabilities (n=31) were the two main causes 
reported. This finding was of particular concern because supervision 
deficiencies were cited mostly for rescues of children under 6 (n = 56) and 6 to 
9 years old (n = 41) who have been reported as the most vulnerable (Kemp & 
Sibert, 1992). The overestimation of swimming capabilities was mainly 
attributed to rescues of 6-9-year-old children (n = 22), especially during the 
learning phase of swimming including when they lost their flotation device 
(n=10). This kind of event has been considered the cause of a number of 
drownings (Stallman, Junge & Blixt, 2008). The compilation of 1) the causes 
reported by lifeguards, and 2) the swimming capabilities of rescued bathers, 
designated as "non-swimmers" were the main victims of supervision 
deficiencies according to reports by parents, animators, or teachers (n = 96). A 
related finding that corroborated these findings had been reported by Petrass 
and Blitvich (2012). 
Discussion 
In some facilities, interventions seemed to have been frequent, while they were 
quite rare in other ones. Different levels of commitment from one PSP facility 
to another by the staff were noted by the researchers, as well as from one 
lifeguard to another within the same PSP.  Numerous lifeguards acknowledged 
being very conscientious about filling out forms.  
Data collected echoed the single-loop learning process (Lukic et al., 
2010), that mostly aimed to correct superficial dimensions of safety problems 
(through technical advice or skills training, for instance). In doing so, this 
system somewhat overlooked the systemic origin of mishaps, although 
fragments of underlying causes were also mentioned. This type of approach 
must therefore be complemented by more in-depth organizational and systemic 
analyses based, for example, on individual semi-directive interviews to help to 
foster the double-loop learning process, which could reveal the root causes of 
failures as well as the influence of organizational values and culture (Lukic et 
al., 2010). These systemic and organizational approaches were encouraged by 
Le Coze (2016) in the industry but also with respect to risky physical activities 
by Soulé (2009), Lebihain (2000), and more recently, by Vignac et al. (2018) in 
French PSP.  
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Near-misses and close calls comprise most, if not all, of the ingredients 
of an accident sequence without the heavy physical and emotional 
consequences for the party involved. Thus, they make the testimonials easier 
and lessen some of the blocks to accident reporting. However, the 
implementation of a valid, reliable, and objective collection system was time-
consuming for many stakeholders. It could even detract lifeguards from their 
most important tasks. On the other hand, in the long term, the analysis of 
gathered data made it possible to better treat reasonably foreseeable accidents. 
This innovative approach constituted an organizational change in terms of risk 
management. Furthermore, the French NF-15288 standard encouraged detailed 
risk analysis approaches (Cranga, 2009). Our study also highlighted how 
difficult it was to mobilize and motivate the lifeguard teams and to set up this 
type of participatory approach in a sustainable fashion, in spite of the initial 
interest that lifeguards and PSP managers had shown. We still are unable to 
answer the question about how to make sure that these professionals reported 
as systematically as possible the incidents they encountered. Like in many 
innovations, the challenge raised here was above all that of the adaptation and 
improvement of the approach.  
Recommendations 
Although it is important to be cautious about the validity and reliability of these 
results (since we do not know exactly which events were reported and which 
were not), we can infer some ideas for prevention: 
• If it is not anticipated in an organizational plan, the management of minor 
injuries may negatively impact the supervision process (for a duration range 
of 3 to 10 minutes in a majority of reported cases). These tasks could 
usefully be delegated to the non-lifeguard staff in the facility in order not to 
impair lifeguard supervision; 
• It is important for the lifeguards not to slacken their supervision efforts 
during off-peak periods since most reported rescues happened under in such 
context; 
• Children under 6 years-old (especially "non-swimmers") require special 
attention since 1) they are particularly vulnerable, and 2) supervision 
failures are frequent on the part of their companions and caregivers; 
• Though they may seem innocuous, shallower pools (or areas of pools) 
proved to be quite dangerous; diligent supervision should not be neglected 
in these areas. 
Limitations 
Our descriptive data probably underestimates the actual occurrence of incidents. 
As a matter of fact, several interviewed lifeguards stated that during peak 
periods, they were more focused on supervision (rightfully) than on maintaining 
the consistently of completing forms. As a consequence, an unspecified number 
of aquatic rescues were not reported, especially for incidents occurring during 
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periods that required constant alertness such as during teaching times. The other 
limits drawn from the qualitative and descriptive analyses of interviews were 
synthesized in the table below. 
Table 2. Interview anecdotes from actual reporting of non-fatal drowning 
incidents 
Limits unveiled Interviews excerpts 
Incompleteness of 
interventions and 
reported incidents 
(events perceived as 
harmless, mundane) 
« Sometimes we do not have the motivation to record 
minor injuries, for example, a small cut, even if it 
should be noted » 
« It’s so innocuous and constant that we often forget, 
after a school session, to note that we assisted kids two 
or three times with the rod » 
Wearisome effect a 
couple of months 
after the initial 
period of eagerness 
« Initially I was very enthusiastic, but then… It requires 
an administrative rigorousness that the lifeguard 
doesn’t really have (…) Either we forget, or we do not 
have the willingness to keep playing » 
« I have not been a very good boy regarding this form. 
I probably filled out 2 or 3 times, while I am performing 
at least 2 to 3 aquatic rescues a week (...) lack of time, 
and laziness a little bit » 
Impairing of the 
supervision, 
prioritization of 
monitoring tasks 
« It's true that it forces you to skip to a degraded supervision, 
which bothers me a little bit » 
« This summer I noticed a lot of risky situations. We went up 
to 4 interventions in 15 minutes! In such circumstances, you 
cannot write in the notebook, you cannot leave the 
supervision… » 
 
Conclusions  
Close calls, much more frequent in PSP than accidents, may provide an 
important source of data to comprehend accident scenarios. While it is to be 
used with some caution, the methodology introduced in this study offered 
interesting opportunities in terms of training and prevention. It showed that 
"things happen" during supervision, making the constant presence of the 
lifeguard essential to maintain the operation of a swimming pool in an accident-
free state (Leveson, 2004). 
Our results showed that a safe PSP is not a facility where no accident 
or incident occurs, but a facility where almost every near-miss is reported in 
order to avoid further escalation into a more serious accident or fatal drowning. 
In this regard, our work encouraged and pushed us to develop an alternative 
way of considering drowning accidents in PSP. 
This initiative posed a risk of oversimplifying the complexity of 
drowning incident sequences. In a way, it was prone to the “root cause 
seduction” (Cooke & Rohleder, 2006), since most reports tend to mention one 
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and only one contributing factor in the event of an aquatic incident. The main 
finding from this experience feedback was actually of a different nature: it 
enhanced the knowledge of 1) the number of interventions, and 2) the duration 
of lifeguards’ solicitations (especially those interfering with their observational 
supervision of the pools). Such data made it possible to estimate the importance 
of such intrusions in the supervision system, potentially hindering the capacity 
to detect in time an actual drowning sequence, and incidentally, the quality of 
supervision.  
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Endnotes 
1 Actualization of a danger, an accident is a  sudden and involuntary event which causes bodily 
injury, in addition to possible material damage. 
2  Accidental scenarios or trajectories consist of multiple factors (e.g., initiating events, 
particular contexts, decisions made at different levels) whose combination has contributed to 
transforming a risky situation into an accident. 
3 Unexpected and sudden event affecting at least one person without entailing bodily injury. 
Example: an aquatic rescue without medical consequences. In this article, we will not 
differentiate between incidents and near-misses (when an accident was narrowly avoided 
according to Vincent, Ennis & Audley (1993). 
4 Analysis of accidents or incidents to make them safety learning materials. 
5 According to Bird's Pyramid (Bird, Cecchi, Tilche & Mata -Alvarez, 1974), based on accident 
statistics in the North American industry in 1969, the probability of a serious accident occurring 
increases when the number of previous near-misses is large. The underlying idea is that every 
serious accident is associated with hundreds of minor incidents that occurred prior to it; this 
suggests that the number of precursors could act as an alarm or a learning system. 
6  Safety factors (SFs) are functions likely to contribute to safe operations (Mazaheri,et al., 
2015). Their positive nature helps to identify measures likely to stop the situation to become an 
accident. 
7 The interviews conducted focused on the general theme of security in organizational way. A 
sub-theme of the interviews was dedicated to the feedback of experience (REX) and more 
specifically to the process of collecting incidents that are the subject of this article. The 
following questions were addressed to the interviewee: How are you involved in this  process? 
When and how do you inquire? What do you think about this approach? Are there any incidents 
which are not recorded? If yes, why, for what reasons? What should be done to improve 
collection? 
viii Teacher, animator, caregiver, etc. 
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